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I. FROM TRESPASS TO ELECTRONIC INVASION
Intrusions upon the privacy of communication are no recent
phenomenon attributable to the twentieth century's conspicuous lack of
decorum. Blackstone long ago laid it down that "[E]aves-droppers, or
such as listen under walls or windows, or the eaves of a house, to
hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mis-
chievous tales, are a common nuisance" punishable at common law.'
Only the techniques of intrusion have become more sophisticated.'
f-Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.S. 1937, LL.B. 1940, Colum-
bia University. Member, New York Bar.
1 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 168.
2 For a discussion of the techniques of wiretapping and bugging, see R. BRowN,
THE ELEcraoNic INVASION (1967); S. DASH, P. SCHWARTZ & R. KNOWLTON, THE
EAVESDROPPERS (1959); B. SpiNDEL, THE OmiNous EAR (1968) ; A. WESTIN, PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM (1967). The following brief summary of technological innovations
appears in Note, Eavesdropping and the Constitution: A Reappraisal of the Fourth
Amendment Framework, 50 MINN. L. REv. 378, 381 (1965) (footnotes omitted):
With the development of miniaturized circuits, the methods of eaves-
dropping have become incredibly subtle. It is now possible to overhear con-
versation held within a closed room by using a device which makes use of
the vibrations in a window pane as it responds to sounds from within. Tubular
and parabolic microphones can intercept conversations held hundreds of yards
away. Acoustic engineers predict that systems will soon be operable which
utilize ultrasonic or electromagnetic waves to penetrate virtually any struc-
tural material and monitor conversation held within. Conversation may be
monitored from within a room by such Machiavellian devices as wireless
transmitters the size of sugar cubes or transmitters disguised as martini
olives which transmit sounds via their toothpick aerials. Even wiretapping has
developed new subtleties with the invention of devices which monitor telephone
conversations by the inductive effect of electromagnetic waves emanating from
the current flowing through telephone lines, thus obviating any need to connect
directly into the wire. Electronic visual devices, such as miniature television
(169)
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When the authorities are the intruders, the consequences are apt
to prove more than a mere nuisance.' Although the fourth amendment
was prompted more by the fear of forceful and arbitrary intrusions on
the part of law officers than by the prospect of their spying and eaves-
dropping,4 its terms were plainly broad enough, at least until the advent
of modern technology, to inhibit both. Since the amendment was held
to condemn all trespassory incursions upon private dwellings by the
authorities,- the home owner could ordinarily protect his secrets from
the prying eyes and uninvited ears of police agents by simple precau-
tions-drawing the shades and avoiding loud disclosures at open
windows.6
That, of course, was before the electronic age. For the lawyer,
Olmstead v. United States 7may be said to mark the transition.
Olmstead was an extraordinarily active and prosperous bootlegger,
a fact which Treasury agents succeeded in documenting by listening to
his phone conversations and those of his codefendants for some five
months prior to their indictment under the National Prohibition Act.
The taps were attached to telephone wires at points outside the defend-
ants' premises. The Court's majority of five concluded that since there
had been no attachment of the persons of the defendants, no physical
invasion of their premises, and no physical seizure of tangible objects,
there had been no search or seizure in the sense of the fourth amendment
and the fruits of the surveillance were admissible.
To Justice Brandeis, in dissent, it was immaterial that there had
been no trespass and no seizure of any tangible object.' The essence
cameras, have become equally sophisticated; although the problem posed by
use of such devices has yet to come before the Court, it must be recognized
that they are at least as controversial as the auditory devices giving rise to
the present problems. It now appears that the only way to be safe from
eavesdropping is to hold all conversations inside a tent-like enclosure, or
to line the room with aluminum foil and use special glass panes in all windows.
S This observation is not confined to the "criminal." As Professor Louis B.
Schwartz has pointed out, "we have all at one time or another committed acts that
the law regards as serious offenses." Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize
Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1954).
4For a general treatment of the historical background of the fourth amendment,
see N. LASsoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CoNsTITuTIoN 211 (55 The Johns Hopkins University Studies in His-
torical and Political Science, 1937).
5 See Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 IARv. L. REv. 361 (1921).
I It has always been true that he who fails to take ordinary precautions to conceal
his actions from would-be observers takes the risk. Thus, in United States v. Lee, 274
U.S. 559, 563 (1927), Justice Brandeis stated for the Court that a vessel owner
could not complain of the action of Coast Guard officers who beamed the searchlight
of their cutter upon the vessel's deck in a search for contraband liquor.
7277 U.S. 438 (1928).
SId. 478-79. In his view, the appropriate remedy was suppression of the tainted
evidence. The Court had already applied the exclusionary principle to private papers
which the United States obtained as the result of an unconstitutional search. Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Thirty-five years passed before the fourth
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of the amendment was to guard against "every unjustifiable intrusion by
the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed . . . ." "  [T]he right to be let alone," the Justice asserted,
is "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men." 10 The principle of the amendment, he concluded, must
be continuously applied to " 'new conditions and purposes,' " adding
prophetically:
Moreover, "in the application of a constitution, our con-
templation cannot be only of what has been but of what may
be." The progress of science in furnishing the Government
with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.
Ways may some day be developed by which the Government,
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce
them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a
jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances
in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of explor-
ing unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. "That places
the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer"
was said by James Otis of much lesser intrusions than these.
To Lord Camden, a far slighter intrusion seemed "subversive
of all the comforts of society." Can it be that the Constitution
affords no protection against such invasions of individual
security? '
Almost forty years later, in Katz v. United States,'3 the Court for
the first time gave unqualified endorsement to the precept that the
amendment "protects people-and not simply 'areas' " and that its reach
"cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physikal intrusion into
any given enclosure." 14 In Katz, FBI agents attached a listening and
recording device to the outside of a public telephone booth which they
correctly surmised was used by the defendant to transmit wagering in-
formation.'5 The Government's activities, Justice Stewart stated for the
Court, violated the privacy upon which Katz "justifiably relied" and
amendment was held to be enforceable against the states through the due process
clause. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The exclusionary principle was
imposed on the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
9 277 U.S. at 478.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 473.
121d. at 474 (footnotes omitted).
13 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
141d. at 353. Justice Stewart had earlier written for the Court that electronic
monitoring of the visiting room of a jail was permissible because the area was not
constitutionally protected. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142-44 (1962) (dictum).
15 Since the listening device was a microphone attached to the booth rather than
a tap on the line, § 605 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964), prohibit-
ing the interception and divulgence of communications by wire and radio, was not in
issue. For a discussion of the Court's interpretation and application of § 605, see
J. LANDY S I, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREmn CouRT, 206-20 (1966).
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"thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment," 1 even though Katz had no proprietary interest
in the premises and the "seizure" was confined to sound waves.
II. ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK?
The Katz decision appears, at first glance, a striking victory for
those who are hostile to the notion of law enforcement officers secretly
monitoring private conversations. But Katz is a decision with a back-
lash which may result in a major increase in the quantum of eaves-
dropping by government agents.
Justice Stewart's opinion noted that the FBI agents who monitored
Katz's calls exercised restraint. They did not initiate the surveillance
until they had observed his habits and established probable cause to
believe that he was using the booth to transmit gambling information.
The surveillance was limited to six occasions and the agents took care
not to monitor when other persons were inside the booth. On this
basis, the Justice concluded that if the agents had obtained advance
approval from a duly authorized magistrate, their "limited search and
seizure" would have been constitutionally permissible."8  He left open
the question whether even such authorization should be required in cases
"involving the national security." 19
In the brief passage extending approval to eavesdropping with prior
authorization, Justice Stewart relies solely upon Osborn v. United
States,2" an opinion he wrote the previous year. Osborn, a Nashville
lawyer, was retained to represent Teamster President James R. Hoffa,
16 389 U.S. at 353.
1 Among the eavesdropping cases which intervened between Olmstead and Katz,
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), and Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505 (1961) are notable. Goldman, adhering to Olmstead, ruled that the use
of an electronic device (a detectaphone placed on the wall of a room adjoining the
office under surveillance) could not be condemned where there was no trespass upon
the premises of the objecting party. Silverman resulted in suppression of conversations
overhead by a "spike mike," thus explicitly establishing the proposition that conver-
sations may be the subject of a "search and seizure." The Court found it unnecessary,
however, to reexamine Goldman since it found that the spike had penetrated the
defendant's premises. Accord, Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (per curiam),
rev'g 204 Va. 275, 130 S.E.2d 437 (1963).
18 389 U.S. at 354-56. Whether Justice Stewart meant that approval could be
granted only in such circumstances or at least in such circumstances will doubtless be
debated in future cases. Text accompanying notes 95-112 infra. One may note in
passing that Fm_. R. CRam. P. 41 made provision for the issuance of warrants only
for the purpose of searching out and seizing designated types of property.
19389 U.S. at 358 n23. Concurring, Justice White states: "We should not
require the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of the
United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the
requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable."
Id. at 364. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Brennan, sharply disagreed with this
suggestion, contending that the protection of the fourth amendment may not be
diminished "because a particular crime seems particularly heinous." Id. at 360.
20385 U.S. 323 (1966).
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who was awaiting trial on a federal charge in that city. Osborn hired
one Robert Vick to make background investigations of persons listed
on the panel from which the jury for the Hoffa trial were to be drawn.
Unbeknownst to Osborn, Vick had previously agreed to inform federal
agents of any "illegal activities" he might discover. In due course Vick
reported that Osborn had requested him to "fix" a prospective juror,
a cousin of Vick's. The government authorities promptly took a written
statement from Vick and showed it to the two judges of the federal
district court. With the judges' approval, the FBI arranged to conceal
a device on Vick's person so that he might make a record of further
conversations with Osborn. At issue in Osborn's subsequent trial for
attempted bribery was the admissibility of incriminatory statements
recorded by the device secreted on Vick. Upholding the use of the
evidence, the Supreme Court stressed two factors: that the recording
was made for "the narrow and particularized purpose" of determining
the truth of Vick's allegations, and that the Government had followed
" 'the procedure of antecedent justification before a magistrate that is
central to the Fourth Amendment.' "21
There is, however, a significant factual difference in the situations
presented by Katz and Osborn. Katz, the Court said, "justifiably re-
lied" upon the assumption that the only person listening was at the
other end of the line. Osborn, on the other hand, knowingly addressed
his proposal to Vick, taking the risk that the latter might inform. Thus,
Osborn was similar to Lopez v. United States,2 an earlier bribery case
in which an Internal Revenue agent concealed a recorder in order to
confirm a taxpayer's prior attempt to corrupt him. In Lopez, the Court
upheld admission of the recording on the reasoning that since the agent
was fully entitled-indeed, duty bound-to disclose the conversation,
there was no valid objection to the use of evidence which reproduced
the conversation more reliably than the agent's memory. One may
argue, as did the three dissenters in Lopez,' that the prospect of having
the other party to a conversation record the event is itself a serious in-
hibition upon communication. But even granting that, the situation is
still different from one in which, unknown to the participants in a con-
2 'Id. at 330.
22373 U.S. 427 (1963). See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
2 3Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justices Douglas and Goldberg. 373
U.S. at 446. Chief Justice Warren supported the majority on limited grounds, stating
that he would permit "the use of electronic devices to corroborate an agent under
the particular facts of this case." Id. at 445. He noted that Internal Revenue agents
are required by their duties to examine the returns of suspected tax evaders and
concluded that they should be able to defend their reputations against the possibility
that one who has offered a bribe will strike back by suggesting that it was solicited.
Id. at 442.
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versation, an outside intruder monitors the exchange.2 4  Nonetheless,
the Osborn Court ignored this distinction and relied on the new ground
of antecedent justification to a magistrate."8 The Katz decision proved
that this choice was no passing aberration.
In the single year between Osborn and Katz, there were two other
notable decisions. One of these was Berger v. New York,2" in which
five Justices concluded that New York's eavesdrop statute 2 7 was un-
constitutional on its face.2 8 The statute permitted a judge to issue a
warrant authorizing electronic surveillance upon the oath of the attor-
ney general, a district attorney, or a police officer above the rank of
sergeant "that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of
crime may be thus obtained, and particularly describing the person or
persons whose communications, conversations or discussions are to be
overheard or recorded and the purpose thereof .. ,, 29 The authori-
zation could be for periods up to sixty days and might be renewed on
application. Observing that the law did not in terms require mention
of the particular crime under investigation, the place to be searched, or
the "things" to be seized, Justice Clark's opinion concludes that it can-
not be squared with the fourth amendment.3" The inherent obtrusive-
ness of eavesdropping, he states, makes the need for particularity "espe-
cially great." 31 Osborn is contrasted and explained as a case in which
the listening device was used in a single instance, " 'under the most pre-
cise and discriminate circumstances,' " to achieve a specific and im-
portant objective-"the effective administration of justice in a federal
court." 32 The tenor of his opinion is discouraging to advocates of
24 Although an informer intrudes upon privacy, an individual may guard against
such intrusion by choosing his confidants with care. However, silence is the only effec-
tive means of protecting oneself against the intrusion made possible by available techn-
iques of electronic surveillance. On this ground alone, society might well conclude that
electronic surveillance is incompatible with personal liberty and should be regarded
as unreasonable per se.
25 The courts of appeals are now in disagreement on the question whether
recordings of the kind sustained in Lopez are permissible in light of the Katz decision.
Compare United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 394 U.S. 957
(1969) (No. 1024, 1968 Term; renumbered No. 46, 1969 Term), with Koran v.
United States, 408 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.) petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3044
(U.S. May 23, 1969) (No. 143).
26 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
27 Ch. 681, § 86, [1967] N.Y. Laws 1623 (repealed 1968).
28 Justices Black, Harlan, and White, in separate dissents, were of the opinion
that the statute should not be judged on its face but as construed and applied by the
New York courts. On this basis, they were satisfied that the requirements of probible
cause and particularity were met. 388 U.S. at 70, 89, 107. Justice Stewart, who
concurred in the result reached by the Court, agreed -with the dissenters' approach
to the statute but thought that the affidavits submitted to the judge in order to
establish probable cause were insufficient. Id. at 68.
29 Id. at 43 n.1 citing Ch. 681, § 86, [1967] N.Y. Laws 1623 (repealed 1968).
SOd. at 58-60.
31 Id. at 56.
32 Id. at 63.
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legalized electronic surveillance: "It is said that neither a warrant nor
a statute authorizing eavesdropping can be drawn so as to meet the
Fourth Amendment's requirements. If that be true then the 'fruits' of
eavesdropping devices are barred under the Amendment." " However,
the Katz dictum,34 soon to follow, was an invitation to devise discrim-
inating mechanisms for just that task.
Almost contemporaneously with Berger, the Court decided Warden
v. Hayden.3 5 Although the case involved the seizure of tangible items
incident to an arrest, its latent implications were broader. In Gouled
v. United States,36 the Court had ruled that search warrants "may not be
used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office and papers
solely for the purpose of making a search to secure evidence to be used
against him in a criminal or penal proceeding . ... " 37 This was the
so-called "mere evidence" rule: one might search for contraband, or the
fruits or instrumentalities of crime, but not for mere evidence of crime.
Hayden's case prompted reexamination of that precept.
In Hayden, the police quickly traced an armed and fleeing robber
to a house, entered it, and placed the suspect under arrest. The specific
question was whether they were entitled to seize, in addition to weapons
and ammunition, items of clothing which served to identify him as the
culprit. The Court concluded that the language of the fourth amend-
ment did not support a distinction between a search for a purely evi-
dentiary object and a search for contraband or the like.3 It also
emphasized that the items of clothing were not "testimonial" or "com-
municative" and that the fifth amendment was therefore not implicated.39
The Court proceeded to explain that historically the sovereign's right of
search and seizure depended upon the assertion of a superior interest in
the property at stake. Fruits of crime were rightfully the property of
the victim and could be reclaimed by public officers. Instrumentalities
3Id.
34 The Court did not merely hold that, in the absence of a warrant, an electronic
search could not meet constitutional standards. It indicated that, subject to certain limi-
tations and conditions, warrants for electronic eavesdropping might be issued. The term
"dictum" refers to this aspect of the opinion.
35 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
36255 U.S. 298 (1921).
371d. at 309. The defendant in Gouled was suspected of a conspiracy to defraud
the Government. The Government's agent, pretending to make a friendly call, obtained
access to his office and stealthily removed several documents, one of which was
later introduced at Gouled's trial. One of the questions certified to the Supreme
Court was whether papers having evidentiary value were subject to seizure under
a search warrant. Disclaiming reliance on the fact that papers, rather than other
tangible objects, were involved, the Court stated that a search warrant may be used
"only when a primary right to such search and seizure may be found in the interest
which the public or the complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the
right to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders
possession of the property by the accused unlawful . . . ." Id.
38 387 U.S. at 300-02.
39 Id. at 302-03.
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by which a felony had been committed were forefeited to the crown as
deodand. Contraband, of course, was likewise forfeited.4' But this
approach, the Hayden Court stated, was an anachronism. The principal
object of the fourth amendment was protection of privacy rather than
property. Search of the house and seizure of the robber's cap and jacket
involved no greater invasion of his privacy than a search and seizure in
quest of his gun and his loot.
The declaration in Hayden-that protection of privacy rather than
property is central to the fourth amendment-is consistent with the
conclusion, shortly to be reached in Katz, that the individual's reason-
able expectations of privacy are protected even though the intrusion
involves no trespass upon his property. Furthermore, Hayden's rejec-
tion of the "mere evidence" rule was essential to the Katz dictum. It
was proof rather than contraband that the agents sought when they
monitored Mr. Katz's best bets of the day. The combined effect of the
two decisions, Hayden and Katz, opened the way for Congress's eager
response.
III. CONGRESS COMES TO THE DANCE
The Court, then, concluded (1) that oral communications, no less
than tangible objects, are susceptible to "search and seizure" in the
sense of the fourth amendment; (2) that the Constitution protects the
individual's freedom of oral communication from intrusion by unseen
law enforcement officers engaged in electronic surveillance, at least in
those situations where the individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy; and (3) that the protection of this privacy does not in any way
depend upon whether the intrusion would also constitute a physical
trespass. Yet the Court has also suggested in the same breath that
there are situations in which, given the advance approval of a magis-
strate, one's reasonable expectation of privacy may be defeated by the
use of an unseen electronic device. This Article challenges the assump-
tions and the reasoning upon which this suggestion apparently rests.
Preliminarily, however, it will be useful to summarize salient
features of the legislation adopted by Congress in 1968 to implement (or
expand upon) the Court's suggestion and to provide, for state and
nation alike, the official rules by which the games of police wiretapping
and bugging are to be conducted.4' This is not to say that what
40 Id. at 303-04. These ideas are expressed in the famous English case of Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765). It appears
that searches and seizures in eighteenth century England were conducted principally
for the purpose of gaining custody of forfeitable property and that there was no
provision in early English law for the return of property seized under a warrant.
Id. at 1066.
41 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. III, 18 U.S.C.
§§2510-20 (Supp. IV, 1965-68).
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Congress has now purported to authorize is fully consistent with the
Court's opinion. As one recent and thoughtful article points out, there
are numerous particulars in which the Court might ultimately find that
the warmth of the legislative reception exceeds the bounds of the judicial
invitation.' An examination of the congressional guide to eaves-
dropping does, however, serve to make more visible and concrete the
implications and dimensions of a system of authorized surveillance. It
is also the system under which we shall be living unless and until it is
modified or rescinded.
Under the new statute, wire interception and interception of oral
communications (bugging) may be authorized, subject to specified
limitations, in order to investigate a wide variety of offenses.43  Among
the federal offenses are murder, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, em-
bezzlement, theft, interstate transportation of stolen property, bribery,
transmission of wagering information, obstruction of justice or of crim-
inal investigations, racketeering and labor offenses, bankruptcy fraud,
and violations of the narcotics laws, as well as any conspiracy to commit
any of the named offenses." Additionally, the enabling legislation ex-
tends to a wide variety of specifically listed state offenses and to other
state crimes "dangerous to life, limb, or property, and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year . ... " " Conspiracies to com-
mit any of the designated crimes are also included. 6
The authorization procedure is initiated in much the same way as
an application for an ordinary search warrant. It begins by an ex parte
proceeding in which the prosecutor 47 presents supporting statements
42 1. Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of
"Law and Order," 67 MICH. L. REv. 455 (1969). Professor Schwartz argues, inter
alia, that there is very strong doubt about the need for eavesdropping and that in all
events Congress might better have left the fashioning of the rules to the Court.
Id. 498-510.
43 "Intercept" is defined as an "aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or
oral communications through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (Supp. IV, 1965-68). "Device" does not include equipment pro-
vided by "a communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its business and
being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business .... "
Id. § 2510(5) (a) (i). Listening in on an extension telephone would apparently require
no authorization. Cf. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957). Nor does the
Act treat as unlawful an interception accomplished with the consent of one of the
parties to the communication. 18 U.S.C. §§2511(2) (c), (d) (Supp. IV, 1965-68).
Cf. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
44 18 U.S.C. §2516(1) (Supp. IV, 1965-68).
45Id. §2516 (2).
46 Id. One may well question the extent of Congress's power to establish limits
and standards for local bugging in investigation of local crimes. The point is not
pursued in this Article since its focus is upon the limitations which the Constitution
may impose upon the use of electronic surveillance.
47 In the case of the federal government, the application must be authorized by
either the attorney general or an assistant attorney general; in the case of a state or
local government, by the principal prosecuting attorney of the state or political
subdivision. Id. §§2516(1), (2).
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or affidavits to a "judge of competent jurisdiction." " In substance,
the prosecutor must offer evidence constituting probable cause to believe
that an offense to which the statute applies "has been, is being, or is
about to be committed . . . . " He is further required to set forth
the place of the proposed interception, the type of communications
sought to be intercepted, and the identity, if known, of the suspected
offender.5" He must also state what other means of investigation have
been attempted and why other means are not feasible. 5 If the judge
finds the showing sufficient,52 he may authorize interception for a period
not to exceed thirty days.53 Extensions for a like period may be granted
on further application. 4
There is, however, a noteworthy exception to the requirement for
advance judicial approval of an interception. This is the so-called
"national security" provision, which reads as follows:
(3) Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605
of the Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1143; 47 U.S.C.
605) shall limit the constitutional power of the President to
take such measure as he deems necessary to protect the Nation
against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a
foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information
deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to
protect national security information against foreign intelli-
gence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter
be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President
to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the
United States against the overthrow of the Government by
force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and
present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.
The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted
by authority of the President in the exercise of the foregoing
powers may be received in evidence in any trial hearing, or
other proceeding only where such interception was reasonable,
and shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is neces-
sary to implement that power.5
481d.
49Id. §2518 (1) (b).
50 Id.
51 Id. §2518 (1) (c).
52 Id. §2518(3).
531Id. §2518 (5).
r4Id.
55 Id. §2511(3). Another significant exception to the requirement of advance
judicial authorization appears in § 2518(7). Pursuant to that section, designated law
enforcement officers, when confronted with an "emergency situation . . .with respect
to conspiratorial activities threatening the national security interest . . . or charac-
teristic of organized crime ..... " may intercept upon their own determination that
there is no time to secure an order and that valid grounds for its issuance do exist.
In these circumstances, the interceptor is directed to apply for an order "within forty-
eight hours after the interception has occurred, or begins to occur." If an order is
denied, any information secured is treated as obtained in violation of the Act.
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Evidence obtained by an authorized interception may be used in
any criminal proceeding, federal or state." Even if the evidence goes
to an offense far removed from that which provided the basis of the
order to intercept, it may be utilized upon a finding that the interception
was conducted in conformity with the Act.5 7  Information or evidence
obtained in the course of an authorized interception may be circulated
to other investigative or law enforcement officers to the extent that the
disclosure is "appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties
of the officer making or receiving the disclosure." 58
IV. SEIZURES OF TANGIBLE OBJECTS AND OF INCRIMINATORY
STATEMENTS: A DISTINCTION WITH A
CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCE
A. The Unreasonable Search
Justice Stewart's Katz opinion has a deceptive simplicity: (1) The
fourth amendment protects the individual's reasonable expectations of
privacy 5' against arbitrary intrusion by governmental authorities. (2)
Therefore, the amendment does not merely guard against arbitrary in-
trusions by the police when they are engaged in a search for tangible
"things"; it also protects oral communications, and it does so irrespec-
tive of whether the intrusion is a technical trespass.' (3) Since, how-
ever, the clause of the fourth amendment setting forth minimal require-
ments for procurement of a search warrant contemplates that "things"
may be seized upon a proper antecedent showing to a magistrate, it is
also permissible to seek evidence by surveillance of oral communications
6M. § 2517(3).
5 Id. § 2517(5).
58Id. §2517(1). Unless the judge finds good cause for postponement, a person
who has been the target of surveillance is given notice of that fact within 90 days
of its termination. Id. § 2518(8) (d). Persons whose communications were inter-
cepted during the surveillance, but who were not named in the order, are given
notice only if the judge in his discretion concludes that the interests of justice would
be served thereby. Id. Use of intercepted material at a trial requires that the affected
party be served in advance with copies of the order and application pertaining to the
interception. Id. §2518(9). Pretrial disclosure of the contents of an intercepted
communication is discretionary with the judge. Id. § 2518(8) (d).
59 While the word "privacy" does not appear in the Constitution, the Court has
often declared in one form or another since its first authoritative exposition of the
fourth amendment in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), that the
amendment protects both "the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."
See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) ; Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427, 462 (1963) (dissenting opinion); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961); cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (concurring opinion)
(1965) (involving the conflict between marital privacy and a state's ban of the use of
contraceptives). See generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HmAv. L.
REv. 193 (1890) ; Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court,
in 1962 SUPREME COURT REViW 212 (P. Kurland ed. 1962).
00 This ruling, as indicated earlier, was foreshadowed by Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
19691
180 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.118:169
if a magistrate gives his prior approval pursuant to appropriate stand-
ards and limitations.
One's immediate reaction to the third proposition is wonder that,
after so long, Anglo-American jurisprudence has conjured up the idea
of official eavesdropping by the magistrate's leave. After all, in its more
primitive forms eavesdropping is an ancient art-known to the
eighteenth century lawyer as a "common nuisance" and an indictable
offense."1 Yet, so far as this author is aware, no judge has ever con-
sidered it within his province to issue the constable a warrant to lurk
under a householder's eaves or to hide in his attic or broom closet to
listen for incriminatory conversation. What has technology wrought?
Has it somehow become more congenial in our "civilized" society-and
more constitutionally tolerable-to admit an electronic intruder which
can pick up every whisper in living room, bedroom, or bath and broad-
cast or record it for the benefit of the police? 62
The power probably was not asserted earlier because there are
obvious differences-both in manner of intrusion and in degree of
obtrusiveness-between an open search for a particular thing in being,
relating to an offense already committed, and a protracted secret search
for an incriminatory act or admission which may occur at some future
time. A procedure of antecedent justification to a magistrate, which
Justice Stewart regards as "central to the Fourth Amendment," 63 can-
not eliminate the effects upon privacy implicit in this distinction.
What is truly central to the fourth amendment, as Justice Bradley
stated in his historic opinion in Boyd v. United States, is "the sanctity
of a man's home and the privacies of life." " To be sure, the warrant
clause of the fourth amendment shows that there is no absolute right to
privacy and no absolute right to exclude the police from one's home.
Putting aside, however, the very serious question whether electronic
surveillance can ever satisfy the specific requirements and conditions of
the warrant clause,65 it should be emphasized that the warrant clause is
far from the whole of the amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
614 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at * 168.
62 For reference to recent state statutes authorizing electronic interception under
court order, see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 47-49 (1967).
63 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (quoting from Justice Stewart's
earlier opinion in Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 330 (1966)).
IN Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
65 Text accompanying notes 95-112 infra.
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On the face of it, the first clause recognizes a comprehensive and
preexisting right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 6 The second clause establishes minimal conditions for the
issuance of a warrant-a reflection of the historic fact that one of the
most notorious means by which privacy was violated, both in England
and in the colonies, was through warrants authorizing broad or general
searches for matter deemed to be contraband. Some of the great
English cases of the eighteenth century-cases well known to the
Framers-turned on issuance of a general warrant to search a man's
papers for seditious utterances. It is also well known that the passions
of the colonists were aroused by the overly broad writs of assistance
used to enforce the customs law."' A natural reading of the amendment
is that a search may be unreasonable even when made pursuant to a
proper warrant. The Framers' antipathy to the general warrant-which
in light of their recent experience was so strong they wished to make it
the subject of a discrete prohibition--does not detract from their express
determination to prohibit all unreasonable intrusions.
This view is supported by the evolution which took place in draft-
ing the amendment. The first draft by the Committee of Eleven stated:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, shall not be violated by warrants
issuing without probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and not particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. 9
Lasson summarizes the ensuing history as follows:
As reported by the Committee of Eleven and corrected by
Gerry, the Amendment was a one-barrelled affair, directed ap-
parently only to the essentials of a valid warrant. The general
principle of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure
seems to have been stated only by way of premise, and the
positive inhibition upon action by the Federal Government
limited consequently to the issuance of warrants without prob-
able cause, etc. That Benson interpreted it in this light is
The first clause "is general and forbids every search that is unreasonable."
Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
,7 Of these, the best known and most influential upon the course of American con-
stitutional decision was Lord Camden's celebrated opinion in Entick v. Carrington, 19
How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765). See also Wilkes v. Wood, 19
How. St. Tr. 1153, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763). See generally N. LASsoN, THE
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 22-50 (55 The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and
Political Science, 1937); J. LANDYNS!I, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME
COURT 19-30 (1966); F. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND, 1476-776
(1952).
6sThe resistance to writs of assistance by men like James Otis of Massachusetts
is a familiar story. For a detailed account, see N. LASSoN, supra note 67, at 51-78.
691 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789) [1789-1791].
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shown by his argument that although the clause was good as
far as it went, it was not sufficient, and by the change which
he advocated to obviate this objection. The provision as he
proposed it contained two clauses. The general right of
security from unreasonable search and seizure was given a
sanction of its own and the amendment thus intentionally given
a broader scope. That the prohibition against "unreasonable
searches" was intended, accordingly, to cover something other
than the form of the warrant is a question no longer left to
implication to be derived from the phraseology of the
Amendment.7"
The Court has given independent significance to the first clause in
holding that in some circumstances a warrantless search may be reason-
able.7'1 It is surely no less in keeping with the history and underlying
purposes of the fourth amendment to conclude that certain types of
searches are inherently unreasonable.
That, of course, is the teaching of Boyd v. United States,' a case
upon which the Court has relied heavily over the years,"3 and which
Justice Brandeis characterized as one "that will be remembered as long
as civil liberty lives in the United States." '  A subpoena duces tecum
was served upon the Boyds, two New York City merchants, as owners
of certain goods against which a forfeiture proceeding had been
initiated. 5 The Boyds were charged with violation of the customs laws.
The subpoena, issued under the authority of an act of Congress, ordered
the production of papers relating to importation of the goods. The
sanction for noncompliance was that facts alleged in the Government's
motion to produce would be regarded as confessed. The Court held
that "compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish a
70 N. LASSON, supra note 67, at 103 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
71Thus, the Court has approved searches without a warrant incidental to a
lawful arrest. It stated in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950), that
this did not depend upon the "practicability of procuring" a warrant, as held earlier in
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), but "upon the reasonableness of the
search after a lawful arrest. . . ." Recently, in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969), the Court held that a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest, made
in the arrestee's home, is a reasonable police measure only if it is confined to the person
of the arrestee and to the area wherein he "might have obtained either a weapon or
something that could have been used as evidence against him." Id. at 768. Rabinowitz
had permitted a broader incidental search: a search for seizeable items reasonably
believed to be located on the premises.
In another series of cases beginning with Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925), the Court has upheld the reasonableness of a warrantless search of a moving
vehicle. See also cases cited in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-58 nn.19 &
20 (1967). For a critique of the cases in these categories, see Landynski, .supra
note 15, at 87-117.
72116 U.S. 616 (1886).
73 In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925), Boyd was described as
"the leading case on the subject of search and seizure."
74 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
75 The Court treated the forfeiture proceeding as criminal in substance although
civil in form. 116 U.S. at 634.
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criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property," was indistin-
guishable from a search and seizure and was therefore "within the
scope of the Fourth Amendment"; 76 that "any forcible and compulsory
extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used
as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the
condemnation of [Entick v. Carrington]"; 7' and that "seizure of a
man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is
[not] substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against
himself." 7s Thus, although the facts would have permitted the Court
to rely solely upon the fifth amendment,"9 it nevertheless found specif-
ically that there was also an unreasonable search and seizure.80 The
Court was at pains to make clear throughout its opinion that the au-
thorities could not acquire personal papers for prosecutorial purposes
whether they proceeded by physical search under a warrant or by any
other form of legal process."'
71GId. at 622. Whether papers of the particular kind involved in Boyd should
be regarded as personal papers, rather than business records, is immaterial for
present purposes.
77Id. at 630. Although there is language in Boyd to the effect that lawful
searches are confined to contraband and the fruits or instrumentalities of crime (see
the discussion of the Gouled case, note 37 supra & accompanying text), the critical
fact for Justice Bradley was probably the attempt to reach what he regarded as
private papers. The offensiveness of a "paper-search" was also emphasized in Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765), to which Justice
Bradley made elaborate reference. In Entick, Lord Camden observed:
Papers are the owner's goods and chattels: they are his dearest property;
and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspec-
tion; and though the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass,
yet where private papers are removed and carried away, the secret nature
of those goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and demand more
considerable damages in that respect.
Id. at 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817-18 (Eng. Rep. greatly abbreviated).
78 116 U.S. at 633.
79 If the Boyds had been obliged to respond to the subpoena, they would have been
required both to produce and authenticate the evidence to be used against them.
Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957); United States v. Austin-Bagley
Corp., 31 F2d 229, 233-34 (1929) (L. Hand, J.).
80 In light of this finding, Boyd cannot be regarded as strictly a fifth amendment
case. The Court does discuss the interdependence of the two amendments, 116 U.S.
at 633, which might lead one to conclude that the search and seizure was unreasonable
only because it resulted in compulsion of self-incriminating testimony. Since the
fifth amendment does not protect against self-incrimination which is not compelled,
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303-04 (1966), this would preclude application
of Boyd to electronic eavesdropping cases. However, the lengthy discussion of the
fourth amendment, Entick, and other search and seizure cases makes it plain that
the Court considered there were two separate grounds for the decision, one of which
was the prohibition of the first clause of the fourth amendment.
s1 In a similar vein, Justice Field stated:
Of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more
essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and
that involves, not merely protection of his person from assault, but exemp-
tion of his private affairs, books, and papers, from the inspection and scrutiny
of others.
In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 250 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
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Boyd certainly dictates the conclusion that a proper concern for
the "privacies of life" precludes the search of a man's home or office to
examine his personal correspondence. Thus, it is inordinately difficult
to see how the Court can endorse surveillance of oral communications
in which persons engage with a reasonable expectation of privacy, unless
it is prepared to repudiate Boyd. Yet Justice Stewart fails even to
mention that decision in Katz.
In his Olmstead dissent, Justice Brandeis correctly observed that a
wiretap is far more intrusive than the searches for contraband conducted
in the colonies pursuant to writs of assistance.82 To Justice Brandeis's
point (which remains intact) one might well add that bugs, parabolic
mikes, and other contemporary devices which now bear the con-
gressional seal of approval are in turn considerably more intrusive than
the wiretap. Awareness of party lines, switchboards, and telephone ex-
tensions may already tend to make people somewhat guarded in their
telephone conversations, quite apart from any thought of a tap. If,
however, one cannot even be assured of privacy in direct conversations
in one's parlor or bedroom, in one's office, club, or automobile, or on
a lonely park bench, little would seem to be left to the man in whom
governmental authorities have developed an interest.
The recent decision in Stanley v. Georgia "I also draws upon the
principle that there is a zone of privacy into which the state cannot
intrude. The Court " held that "the mere private possession of obscene
matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime." ' It assumed that
the material on which the prosecution was based-films discovered in
the course of a search pursuant to a warrant authorizing the seizure of
bookmaking apparatus-was obscene,86 and indicated that its public
display or distribution might be forbidden8 However, it went on to
say that "a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own
82 277 U.S. at 474. Justice Brandeis also commented:
Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at both
ends of the line is invaded and all conversations between them upon any
subject, and although proper, confidential and privileged, may be overheard.
Id. at 475-76. As noted earlier, the premises upon which the Olmstead majority
concluded that the wiretapping in that case was beyond the reach of the fourth
amendment have been rejected. Text accompanying notes 13-17 supra.
83 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
4The result was unanimous, but only 5 Justices joined in the opinion of the
Court. Three of the 4 concurring Justices- (Justices Stewart, Brennan, and White)
expressed the view that taking the films and projecting them on a screen to examine
the contents was an abuse of the limited authority contained in the warrant and
hence a violation of the fourth amendment's requirement of particularity. Id. at
569-72.
Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
86Id. at 559 n2.
87 Id. at 567-68.
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house, what books he may read or what films he may watch." ss For
not only does the first amendment uphold "the right to read or observe
what [one] pleases"; 89 one also has a "right to be free, except in very
limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into
one's privacy." 9' One would surely suppose that the right to com-
municate with one's intimates and associates, in one's own home, free
from unwanted governmental intrusion, is no less worthy of protection
than the right to view dirty pictures in the living room.
The view that there is a zone of privacy which is protected from
intrusion, with or without a search warrant, is likewise expressed in
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,
where he asks the rhetorical question: "Would we allow the police to
search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the
use of contraceptives ?" 9"
Warden v. Hayden 2 is also consistent with the zone of privacy
theory. In rejecting the mere evidence rule, the Court carefully pre-
served the distinction between tangible and communicative objects:
The items of clothing involved in this case are not "testi-
monial" or "communicative" in nature, and their introduction
therefore did not compel respondent to become a witness
against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment ...
This case thus does not require that we consider whether there
are items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them
from being the object of a reasonable search and seizure. 3
To be sure, the scope that is accorded to a "right of privacy"-or,
to state it in fourth amendment terms, the determination when a govern-
mental intrusion violates "the right of the people to be secure . .
against unreasonable searches and seizures"-ultimately involves an
appraisal of values for which there are no given weights or measures.
Even so, can one fairly characterize the idea of law enforcement officers
secretly and pervasively monitoring the homes, offices, and meeting
places of the citizenry in search of proof of crime as anything less than
deeply offensive to the values of a decent society? Speaking some years
ago of a much lesser electronic intrusion than those recently approved
by Congress, Judge Jerome Frank stated:
A man can still control a small part of his environment.
. . . [H]e can retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the
s8 Id. at 565.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 564.
91381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
92 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
'3 Id. at 302-03.
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knowledge that they cannot get at him without disobeying the
Constitution. That is still a sizeable hunk of liberty-worth
protecting from encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized
society must provide some such oasis, some shelter from public
scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some in-
violate place which is a man's castle. 4
The time has come when, if we give reign to the advancing science
of electronics, there will be no hiding place down here.
B. The Warrant Clause
If, as urged above, electronic surveillance by the authorities is to
be condemned as a breach of privacy incompatible with the fundamental
values protected by the fourth amendment, it is unnecessary to consider
the specifics of the warrant clause. That is to say, if oral communica-
tions in which persons engage with a reasonable expectancy of privacy
are immune from governmental intrusion, it is superfluous to ask what
procedures would be constitutionally required if they were violable.
On the other hand, one can reverse the questions and ask, at the
outset, whether it is possible to reconcile the practice of electronic sur-
veillance with the requirements of the warrant clause. If not, there is
no constitutional means of obtaining the antecedent judicial approval
upon which the Katz dictum and title III of the 1968 Act depend."
This approach would be in keeping with the judicial preference for
narrow and specific, rather than broad, grounds of adjudication.
There is, however, some awkwardness in deciding the constitution-
ality of electronic surveillance solely by reference to the formal require-
ments for issuance of a warrant. Those requirements were drawn when
the only known method of conducting a search was by dispatching a
person to perform the job, and the only contemplated object of a search
was tangible. Application of the language of the warrant clause to
wholly unanticipated conditions is not simply a matter of resort to the
dictionary and the tools of logic. As with the first clause of the amend-
ment, the process of interpretation calls for an appraisal of underlying
V United States v. On Lee, 193 F2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1951) (dissenting
opinion), aff'd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). In On Lee, the overheard conversation was
between the defendant and an undercover agent carrying a concealed microphone
in his overcoat pocket. The microphone transmitted the words to another agent
standing outside the shop within which _the conversation occurred. Accord, Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), discussed at text accompanying notes 22-23 stpra.
The 1968 legislation would require no authorization when a conversation is monitored
with the consent of one of the participants. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (c) (Supp. IV,
1965-68).
95 One qualification is in order. The Katz dictum left open the question whether
a warrant would be required in the case of offenses relating to national security. 389
U.S. at 358 n. 23. Congress has fashioned statutory exceptions to the warrant pro-
cedure in cases involving national emergency. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(3), 2518(7) (Supp.
IV, 1965-68). The question of national security is discussed at text accompanying
notes 113-51 infra.
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purposes. Thus, whether one begins with the first or second clause,
the relevant considerations tend to converge. However, by looking
at both one may gain added perspective.
The first requirement of the warrant clause is a showing of probable
cause. There is no apparent reason why an officer proposing to engage
in electronic surveillance could not establish, in much the same way as
one seeking leave to conduct an orthodox search, grounds for believing
that the target of the investigation has committed, or is engaged in
committing, a particular offense. It is worth noting, however, that one
of the principal "practical" justifications regularly advanced by advo-
cates of electronic eavesdropping is that it provides the police unrivaled
opportunity to keep an eye on the manifold activities of organized crim-
inals (or those suspected to be) and to gain "strategic intelligence"
concerning their "organizational structure and operational methods." "6
Since surveillance for the avowed purpose of conducting a general watch
would never pass muster, the pursuit of strategic intelligence, under a
system such as that devised by Congress, also requires a bit of tactical
make-believe: one must designate an ostensible objective (evidence re-
lating to a particular offense) in order to obtain an unadvertised by-
product (the wealth of information yielded by a protracted electronic
surveillance) .
This of course points up the critical question posed by the warrant
clause: can one reconcile the inherent character of an electronic sur-
veillance with the condition that the warrant describe with particularity
"the things to be seized"?
That electronic eavesdropping is indiscriminate is indisputable. A
bug, wherever planted, picks up the utterances of all who come within its
range, whether or not the communication bears any relation to the de-
scription of subject matter contained in the warrant. The bug knows
no principle of relevancy, has no objection to hearsay or gossip, and is
quite unacquainted with common law doctrines of privilege. It is, in a
word, omnivorous.
The requirement of particularity, on the other hand, was designed
to prevent the random or general foray. In the nonelectronic case,
96 The quoted language appears in PRESIDENT'S COmm'N or LAW ENFORCEM ENT
& ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIlE IN A FREE SocIETy 199
(1967). Pertinent excerpts from that report are reproduced in the appendix to
Justice White's dissenting opinion in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 119, 122-23
(1967). See also H. Schwartz, supra note 42, at 468-72.
97In Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927), quoted with approval
by the majority's opinion in Berger, 388 U.S. at 58, the Court declared that the
amendment prevents "the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As
to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the
warrant." On the other hand, title III contemplates both investigative use of informa-
tion unrelated to the description in the warrant and introduction of such material in
evidence. Text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
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specifying the object to be seized limits the extent of intrusion in two
ways: it narrows the scope of search,9" and it confines the taking to the
object described. 9  Individual justices have defended electronic sur-
veillance against these criticisms on two grounds: (1) almost all
searches, however conducted, are bound to reveal "items which do not
relate to the purpose of the search"; 100 (2) "[j]ust as some exercise of
dominion, beyond mere perception, is necessary for the seizure of
tangibles, so some use of the conversation beyond the initial listening
process is required for the seizure of the spoken word." '
In regard to the first point, there are limitations in the nature and
practice of the conventional search that cannot be incorporated in the
electronic search. It is undoubtedly true that if the police are engaged
in a visual search for a designated object, they are very likely to see
numerous other tangible items in their quest for the specified one.
However, it is by no means inevitable that they will see or examine
every possession of the resident. The officer engaged in the traditional
search announces his identity and provides notice of the extent of his
authority.' ° The homeowner or office tenant may be able to satisfy the
warrant by voluntarily producing or promptly revealing the item in
question.'0 3  In other situations, the character of the described item will
itself impose limitations. Police searching for a still or a rifle could
hardly justify combing the contents of small drawers. To be sure, if
they are searching for heroin they might well have reason to go through
a man's books and papers in hopes of finding glassine envelopes con-
taining powdery substances. Even in that case, however, they could
claim no authority to examine the books for telltale traces of obscenity
or to photostat the papers in the thought that they might produce some-
thing incriminatory.1 °"
9 8 In Judge Learned Hand's words, "limitations upon the fruit to be gathered
tend to limit the quest itself . . . ." United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914
(2d Cir. 1930); cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
99 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) ; cf. Kremen v. United States,
353 U.S. 346 (1957).
100 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 108 (1967) (White, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 98 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
102 The so-called rule of announcement has a long history. See Semayne's Case,
5 Co. Rep. 91, 92, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603); Blakey, The Rile of An-
nouncement & Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. California, 112
U. PA. L. Rav. 499 (1964). Its observance is apparently regarded by the Court as
constitutionally required in the absence of exigent circumstances. Ker. v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1962). See also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967) ; Miller
v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
103 Also, knowing the limits of the officer's authority, he is in a position to protect
his interests. See the discussion of the right of self-protection in Frank v. Maryland,
359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959). Justice Brennan has remarked that the only protection
against current techniques of electronic eavesdropping is to refrain from speech.
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 450 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
1
0 4 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569-72 (1969) (concurring opinion).
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The conventional search is limited to a designated thing in being-
one of a finite number of things to be found in the place where the search
is to be conducted, and ordinarily discoverable in a single brief visit.
On the other hand, electronic surveillance is a quest for something which
may happen in the future. Its effectiveness normally depends upon a
protracted period of lying-in-wait. For however long that may be, the
lives and thoughts of many people-not merely the immediate target but
all who chance to wander into the web-are exposed to an unknown and
undiscriminating intruder. Such a search has no channel and is certain
to be far more pervasive and intrusive than a properly conducted search
for a specific, tangible object at a defined location.
As Justice Harlan has observed, if listening by itself constituted
seizure, "it would be virtually impossible for [the] . . . authorities
. . . to describe with particularity the seizures which would later be
made during extended eavesdropping .... ," 105 Moreover, there
would inevitably be seizures which lacked "sufficient nexus with the
offenses for which the order was first issued." 106 As indicated in the
quotation above (that states the second defense of electronic surveil-
lance), the Justice avoids this problem by suggesting that, just as
seizure of a tangible object occurs only with the exercise of dominion,
there is no "seizure" of oral communications until use is made of them.
However, there are two serious difficulties with this theory.
First, whatever happens later, violation of a confidential communi-
cation is itself a grave detriment. Not only is it an inroad upon the
personal liberty of those caught in the net of surveillance; it is also an
inhibition upon all members of the society in which the practice gains
footing.
Second, there is no means by which the magistrate can adequately
police the police in their use of the information dredged up. Quite
1o5 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 97 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"O1 Id. at 97-98. It may be suggested that the situation presented by Katz v.
United States falls within the exceptional category. In light of Katz's observed
habits and the extensive background information known to the investigators, it was
possible in that instance "to describe with particularity the seizures which would later
be made." But although it may have been fairly predictable that gambling would be
discussed, it certainly was not predictable that the conversations would be confined
to that subject. Of course, if future decisions limit the Katz decision to circumstances
in which one can fairly forecast the content of each conversation to be monitored, its
significance will be small. It is difficult to believe, however, that Justice Stewart, the
author of the Katz opinion, intended only that, when he invited law enforcement
officers to seek antecedent judicial approval of electronic surveillance. The same
Justice earlier expressed the view that New York's eavesdrop statute was "entirely
constitutional." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 68 (1967) (concurring opinion).
Moreover, he voted to reverse the conviction in Berger on the sole ground that the
showing of probable cause was too bare to support an order authorizing a continuing
60-day surveillance of a lawyer's office. Id. at 70. In view of the changed composi-
tion of the Court (only 2 of the 5 justices who found New York's eavesdrop statute
unconstitutional remain on the Court; the 4 justices who were of the contrary opinion
are still sitting), it seems unlikely that the Katz dictum will be so strictly cir-
cumscribed.
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apart from incriminatory implications, excavation of private com-
munications may yield nuggets of endless variety-items for the voyeur,
items of political significance, items of commercial value, items of in-
terest to the press, items for divorce courts, and items for blackmail.
Those who conduct the surveillance may file the information in their
minds for future reference, enter it in dossiers, or feed it to data banks.
They may also transmit it to other official investigators, or "leak" it to
the press or to interested private persons.
01 7
An agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation recently acknowl-
edged under oath that the Bureau had conducted an extended surveil-
lance of the late Dr. Martin Luther King.' s It has also been reported
by columnist Carl T. Rowan, former head of the United States Informa-
tion Agency, that during his period of government service he saw
summaries of recorded conversations resulting from a surveillance of
Dr. King; that these summaries contained derogatory information con-
cerning the subject's sex life; and that the Director of the FBI, in
pursuit of his own purposes, divulged this information to various per-
sons, including favored journalists and selected members of Con-
gress.0 9  In considering this example-involving the agency which
enjoys the best reputation for probity among our police organizations-
one should bear in mind that if eavesdropping is sanctioned, it will be
practiced not only by federal investigators, but also in state and munici-
pality, town and county." It is notoriously easy for prosecutors to
107 A former assistant district attorney of Kings County, New York, reported
many instances in which police officers engaged in wiretapping, both with and
without court orders, used the information obtained in order to "shake down"
the persons overheard. S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS
55-62 (1959). The same authors noted a similar pattern in New Orleans. Id. 124-25.
108 N. Y. Times, June 5, 1969, at 27, col. 1.
109 Phila. Evening Bulletin, June 16, 1969, at 17, col. 7. See also THE NATION,
June 23, 1969, at 780-81 & July 7, 1969, at 5; I. F. STONE'S WEEKLY, June 30, 1969,
at 4. Responding to Mr. Rowan's comments, Associate Director Clyde A. Tolson of
the FBI confirmed the fact of the surveillance and stated that its conduct was author-
ized by the late Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. N. Y. Times, June 19, 1969, at
25, col. 5. He did not deny Mr. Rowan's statements regarding dissemination.
110 Another example of an apparently calculated "leak" by federal officers is
provided by a complex litigation arising in Nevada. The United States brought a
prosecution for income tax evasion against one Edward Levinson, the proprietor of
a Las Vegas hotel and casino, on the theory that he had been "skimming" receipts at
the casino, failing to record and report income. Discovering that his establishment had
been extensively monitored by the FBI, Levinson brought an action for damages in
the state courts for breach of privacy, naming the local telephone company (which
had collaborated with the Government) and agents of the FBI as defendants. The
civil action was highly embarrassing to the United States. Not only was there the
threat of a substantial money judgment against FBI agents who had been following
instructions of their superiors; the Nevada court also issued orders, at the behest of
the civil plaintiffs, which would have permitted extensive discovery of the techniques
and practices employed by the Bureau. Elson v. Bowen, 83 Nev. 515, 518-19, 436 P.2d
12, 14 (1967). While both the criminal and civil actions were pending, unidentified
quotations from private conversations involving Levinson appeared in an issue of
Life magazine. Smith, The Mob, LIFE, Sept. 8, 1967, at 91. The excerpts suggested
that Levinson was "skimming" $100,000 a month from the gaming tables, and were
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obtain search warrants."' Since the description of subject matter in a
warrant, no matter how specific, has no effect upon the scope of an
electronic search, our law enforcement officers, armed with the very
latest devices and the law's blessing, may soon have ambitions of
collective omniscience.
It is true that Justice Harlan's approach, contrary to that adopted
in title III, seems to forbid prosecutorial use of incriminatory evidence
unrelated to the description in the warrant. Such a rule, however, is
more easily laid down than administered. In practice it may be difficult
for the persons affected to preclude indirect use. Stimulated and aided
by the information, the authorities may contrive to construct an "inde-
pendent" case. Or a lead may be quietly conveyed to an interested in-
vestigator in another branch of government or in another jurisdiction.
To follow such a lead to its ultimate destination is like trying to track
a rumor to its source.1 2
In short, electronic surveillance is almost inevitably a general search
and the consequences of such indiscriminate spying are not only
harassing, but inherently unmanageable.
V. OF SECURITY AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
A. The Issue Emerges
In his Berger dissent, Justice Black observed that there were those
who would bar electronic eavesdropping "except in searching for evi-
taken verbatim, according to Levinson's counsel, from the FBI's records of the sur-
veillance. At the time the Life story appeared, the material derived from the surveil-
lance was classified. It had been submitted to the Nevada trial court but had not been
made available to the public.
The tactical skirmishes between the Government and Mr. Levinson ended in
March, 1968, when the United States accepted a no contendere plea in the tax case
(resulting in the imposition of a fine) and Mr. Levinson simultaneously dismissed
his multi-million dollar action for damages. N. Y. Times, March 29, 1968, at 22,
col. 4.
It may also be noted that other Life articles on crime by Sandy Smith have like-
wise drawn heavily on material derived from official eavesdropping. See Life, Sept. 1,
1967, at 15, Sept. 29, 1967, at 34, March 15, 1968, at 66 & May 30, 1969, at 45. In some
instances, the source is rather clearly indicated; in others, it is inferable.
111 Probable cause may be rested in large part on the words of confidential in-
formants, see Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), if more respectable
affiants are unavailable. The prosecutor is often able to choose his judge. The
proceedings, which are of course ex parte, are often little mre than a formality.
Comments to this effect by judges, prosecutors, and lawyers are noted in H. Schwartz,
supra note 42, at 483-84.
112 For example, in the early 1960's, an Internal Revenue agent named Yung
engaged in extensive wiretapping in Miami, Florida, collecting a mass of information
which he thought might be useful in the investigation of tax evasion. Many of the
intercepted calls were long distance calls to or from persons in other parts of the
country. Yung made a practice of telephoning field agents in other areas when he
had information pertaining to persons in their locality. However, he kept no records
to show what information was passed on or to whom. Since Yung's activities have
come to light, protracted proceedings have been conducted in a number of criminal
cases in an effort to determine whether the prosecution's evidence was tainted by the
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dence in the field of 'national security,' whatever that means." 113 That
term, whatever it does mean, has served as an umbrella for a wide
variety of official enterprises ranging from investigations of employee
loyalty, dissident organizations, and organized crime, to the conduct
of espionage.
In 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt expressed his concern
that "fifth columns" were at work and authorized the attorney general,
"after investigations of the need in each case," to use listening devices
in order to protect the nation's defenses from the activities of suspected
spies and saboteurs. Declaring that "under ordinary and normal cir-
cumstances" such surveillance should not be conducted "for the excellent
reason that it is almost bound to lead to abuse of civil rights," the
President indicated that his sole aim was to seek intelligence and that he
was not proposing "the use of evidence secured over tapped wires in the
prosecution of citizens in criminal cases." Finally, he cautioned that the
surveillance should be confined "to a minimum" and "insofar as possible
to aliens." 114
Nevertheless, the aftermath of World War II witnessed an ex-
pansion, rather than a contraction, of the authorization to engage in
electronic spying. Attorney General Tom C. Clark, stating that it was
a "troubled period in international affairs" and noting that crime was
increasing "here at home," concluded (with President Truman assent-
ing) that it was imperative to use listening devices "in cases vitally
affecting the domestic security." "1 In 1954, Attorney General
Brownell cited the prevalence of FBI taps-as many as 200 at one
time-as evidence of his department's vigilance." 6  Senate hearings in
1965 revealed that the techniques were being widely utilized by other
federal agencies, notably the Internal Revenue Service.1
7
Shortly thereafter, Department of Justice lawyers became aware
that FBI reports used in the preparation of criminal cases were not
Yung wiretaps. See Petition for Certiorari, McGarry v. United States, 394 U.S. 921
(1967) ; Hearings on S. 928 Before the Subcomin. on Administrative Practice &
Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at
140-58. The process of reconstruction is a hazardous game at best.
113 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 88 (1967).
114 Memorandum from President Roosevelt to Attorney General Jackson, May 21,
1940, on file in the Truman Library, Independence, Mo. It is quoted at length in
Theoharis & Meyer, The "National Security" Justification for Electronic Eaves-
dropping: An Elusive Exception, 14 WAYNr L. REv. 749, 759 (1968).
115 Letter from Attorney General Clark to President Truman, July 17. 1946, on
file in Truman Library, Kansas City, Mo., reprinted in Theoharis & Meyer, slepra
note 114, at 760-61 (emphasis added in reprinted source). At the foot of the com-
munication, the President noted, "I concur."
116 N.Y. Times, April 21, 1954, at 18, col. 1. See generally Brownell, The Public
Security and Wire Tapping, 39 CORNELL L. Q. 195 (1954).
117 Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 39 Before the Subcommn. on Administrative
Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, on Invasions of Privacy
(Government Agencies), 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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always what they seemed to be."8 Information which they supposed,
from their reading of the reports, came from live informants in fact
frequently emanated from inanimate bugs. In a series of criminal
cases beginning with Black v. United States,"" the department's lawyers
disclosed to the courts that unlawful electronic surveillance had taken
place prior to trial and that there was an issue of tainted evidence to be
resolved.2 In a memorandum filed with the Supreme Court while
Black was pending, Solicitor General Marshall said:
Under Departmental practice in effect for a period of years
prior to 1963 and continuing into 1965, the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation was given authority to ap-
prove the installation of devices such as that in question for
intelligence (and not evidentiary) purposes when required in
the interest of internal security or national safety, including
organized crime, kidnapping and matters wherein human life
might be at stake.'
In short, "national security" had come to embrace whatever Director
Hoover regarded as menacing to domestic tranquility or smacking of
organized crime.
The Court's opinion in Katz, as noted earlier, left open the question
whether "safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate
would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the
national security." '22 Title III undertook to resolve that question
affirmatively, for the federal government. It assumes a presidential
power to use the investigatory measures deemed necessary "to protect
the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or
other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to
the structure or existence of the Government." Finally, it provides that
matter may be received in evidence where "interception was reason-
able ... ,, '3
118 The uninitiate may be skeptical of the claim that the right hand of the
Department was not fully aware of what the left hand was doing, but those who have
served as attorneys of the Department know that dealing with the officialdom of
the FBI is not unlike negotiating with a hostile foreign power.
19 385 U.S. 26 (1966). Several of the later cases in which similar disclosures
were made are cited in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62 (1967).
'20 Until Katz was decided in 1967, the Government adhered to the view that
electronic surveillance was unlawful only when accomplished by a trespass. That was
concededly the situation in Black, where a bug was secreted in the business suite
of the defendant, a Washington public relations man.
121 Supplemental Memorandum for the United States, reprinted in Hearings on
S.928 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice & Procedure of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, on the Right of Privacy Act of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 34 (1967).
122 389 U.S. at 358 n23.
123 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-68), in text accompanying note 55 supra.
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B. Domestic Security as a Justification for Surveillance
by Executive Prerogative
The United States recently acknowledged that a number of demon-
strators whom it has indicted for conspiracy to incite to riot in United
States v. Dellinger,'14 the so-called Chicago Riots Case, were overheard
by electronic eavesdropping. The Government has argued, however,
that certain of the surveillances were lawful because undertaken for
"security." 125 This contention was not advanced in an effort to
introduce the conversations in evidence-which the Government an-
nounced at the outset that it did not propose to do-but in order to avoid
the necessity of disclosing to the defendants the contents and surround-
ing circumstances." 6 With this objective, the United States attorney
presented to the trial judge a confidential affidavit from the attorney
general and sealed exhibits relating to the surveillances represented as
lawful.
Acceptance of the contention that the eavesdropping was per-
missible would mean (1) that the defendants have no civil remedy
against those responsible for the intrusion, and (2) that they have no
right in the criminal proceeding brought against them to explore the
issue whether the interceptions contributed to the Government's case.
It would also mean that the Government, in similar circumstances, could
offer intercepted conversations in evidence if it chose to do so.
The Government's reasoning, set forth in its brief to the district
court, is as follows. It is notorious that there are organizations in this
country which intend to "attack and subvert the existing form of our
government." 127 Moreover, there has been "an increasing number of
124 United States v. Dellinger, No. 69 Cr. 180 (N.D. Ill., filed March 20, 1969).
The indictment was returned in March, 1969, following a grand jury investigation of
the disorders which occurred during the Democratic National Convention in August,
1968. See N.Y. Times, March 21, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
125 Brief for the United States at 17-20 & passim, United States v. Dellinger, No.
69 Cr. 180 (N.D. Ill., filed March 20, 1969).
126Id. at 2-3. In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 180-85 (1969), and
companion cases the Court ruled that a defendant was entited to disclosure of his con-
versations (or those which occurred on his premises) overheard during the course of an
illegal electronic surveillance. The Court rejected the Government's argument that it
should be permitted to make disclosure in camera with a view to persuading the trial
judge that the fruits of the surveillance were irrelevant to the case. Defendant's counsel,
the Court concluded, was entitled to explore in an adversary proceeding the question
whether the prosecution might be tainted, directly or indirectly, by material derived
from the interceptions. However, in Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310, 313
(1969), it emphasized that Alderman applied only when the surveillance was illegal,
stating that "of course, a finding by the District Court that the surveillance was
lawful would make disclosure and further proceedings unnecessary."
127 Brief for the United States at 18, United States v. Dellinger, No. 69 Cr. 180
(N.D. Ill., filed March 20, 1969). The surveillances in Dellinger occurred prior
to the enactment of title III, and the Government suggested that they were subject
to the standards prevailing when the interceptions took place, pointing to Desist v.
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instances in which federal troops have been called upon by the states to
aid in the suppression of riots." "s In such a state of affairs, it is both
"reasonable" (hence permissible under the fourth amendment) and
within the inherent power of the executive "to utilize electronic sur-
veillance to gather intelligence information" in order to protect the
nation from danger.2 Moreover, the determination to take that step
"comes within the competence of the executive" and the warrant pro-
cedure is inappropriate because it would require the judiciary to make
determinations, such as appraisal of the danger to the national security,
for which it is ill-suited.' 30
It is plain that in the attorney general's view exercise of this
prerogative would not depend upon evidence that the persons whose
privacy was to become forfeit had engaged in crime or were currently
involved in the commission of an offense. It would be enough that the
attorney general considered them troublesome or subversive and appre-
hended danger. Presumably, if he believes that "Students for a Demo-
cratic Society," an outspoken peace group, or a militant black organiza-
tion is likely to engage in provocative or radical conduct, he may decide
to order extensive surveillance of the membership to secure advance
intelligence. 3'
Even if one assumes that there are circumstances in which it is
permissible to monitor private conversations, Mr. Mitchell's claim is
extreme. In substance, he asserts a right to search on suspicion; a right
to engage in general searches for strategic intelligence; and a right to
determine for himself, under standards undeniably vague, when and for
how long the suspect citizen and his associates shall be placed under
secret watch of the police.'
32
United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), which ruled that Katz would not be retroactively
applied. However, the Government's formulation of the executive power in cases
involving domestic security, as stated in their brief in Dellinger, is substantially
similar to that set forth in title III, 18 U.S.C. §2511(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-68).
128 Brief for the United States at 18, United States v. Dellinger, No. 69 Cr. 180
(N.D. Ill., filed March 20, 1969).
12 Id.
130 Id. at 19-20.
131 Indeed, the press has widely reported, without contradiction from the Depart-
ment of Justice, that Attorney General Mitchell has directed the FBI to keep various
black organizations under surveillance. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1969, § 6
(Magazine) at 10, col. 2-3. The Department has also acknowledged, in a proceeding
before the Subversive Activities Control Board, that it conducted a surveillance of the
W. E. B. DuBois Clubs. N.Y. Times, March 20, 1968, at 17, col. 1. Presumably, this
took place under the prior administration.
132 The last objection would not hold if the courts were to decide that antecedent
judicial approval is required in so-called security cases. Yet, there is little basis for
confidence that the warrant procedure would make an appreciable difference. Few
judges are inclined to turn down applications for a search warrant. Note 111 .supra.
They probably would be even less disposed to do so in instances when the nation's
chief legal officer asserts a threat to national security.
1969]
196 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [VoI.118:169
The justification he offers is the protection of domestic security.
Yet the Court has repeatedly warned that "even the war power does not
remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties." 138
The Government's approach would not only override what have long
been regarded as basic protections afforded by the fourth amendment;
it would also "cut deeply into the right of association" 134 by subjecting
those who join dissident organizations to possible loss of privacy and to
fear of harassment.' 5 In United States v. Robel, the Court con-
demned as overbroad a statute which made it an offense for a member
of the Communist Party to continue as an employee of a defense facility,
stating, "It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense,
we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties-the freedom
of association-which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile." 136
It is no less ironic that the attorney general should press a claim
of executive prerogative similar to that advanced by the British cabinet
and rejected by the English courts in the name of liberty more than
two centuries ago in decisions which became "the byword of the times
even in far-away America." laT In 1762, Lord Halifax as Secretary of
State issued a warrant directing the King's messengers to seize the
books and papers of John Entick, author of the Monitor or British
Freeholder." The Crown saw Entick as a dangerous source of
seditious utterances. The seizure accomplished, Entick responded by
suing the messengers for trespass. A favorable jury verdict was upheld
by the Court of Common Pleas, Lord Camden declaring: "If this point
should be determined in favour of the jurisdiction, the secret cabinets
and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to
the search and inspection of a messenger, whenever the secretary of
state shall think fit to charge, or even to suspect, a person to be the
author, printer, or publisher of a seditious libel." " One may fairly
133 Home Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
'34 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
135 The propensity of law enforcement officials to accumulate the dossiers of
persons regarded as dissident is illustrated by Anderson v. Sills, 106 N.J. Super. 545,256
A.2d 298 (1969). The case involves a challenge to a state-wide intelligence system for
reporting "security incidents." The incidents are described in the reporting form to in-
clude "Left wing, Right wing, Civil Rights, Militant, Nationalistic, Pacifist, Religious,
Black Power, Ku Klux Klan, Extremist, etc." A Superior Court judge ordered the
attorney general to destroy the files and reports submitted to him by local police pur-
suant to his directive, on the ground that the system of surveillance was so all-
embracing as to inhibit activity protected by the first amendment. This is not to
imply that techniques of electronic surveillance were authorized or utilized. The
court's opinion does not discuss the means employed to gather the "security" data.
136 389 U.S. at 264.
137 N. LAssor, supra note 67, at 45-46. Professor Lasson also points out that
leading figures in the colonies-James Otis, Samuel Adams, John Hancock, and John
Adams, among others-were keenly interested in the resistance by men like Wilkes
and Entick to general searches for seditious libel.
13 8 Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
139 Id. at 1063. 95 Eng. Rep. at 817 (Eng. Rep. greatly abbreviated).
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say that if the official view, as currently expressed, should carry the
day, the private communications of any person will be subject to sur-
veillance whenever the attorney general shall see fit to charge, or even
to suspect, him of activity characterized as dangerous to the nation.' °
C. The Executive and Foreign Intelligence
Many Americans doubtless have serious reservations about wire-
tapping and bugging by police officers-witness the prolonged re-
sistance to federal legislation approving those practices.41 But when
it comes to the protection of defense secrets, espionage, and counter-
espionage there is apparently wide acceptance of the idea that the game
is a special and dangerous one, and that ordinary rules and restraints
go by the board.
The arguments currently advanced by the Department of justice
to support executive discretion to conduct electronic surveillance in quest
of foreign intelligence are not unlike those noted above: vital interests
are at stake; electronic eavesdropping may perform a valuable service;
and the executive is best equipped to appraise the needs and practicalities
of the situation. Moreover, the choice of appropriate means falls within
his prerogatives as commander-in-chief and as the principal officer in
the conduct of foreign affairs.' The constitutional objections are like-
wise similar to those which apply in the area of domestic security: the
tenet that the fourth amendment protects privacy of communication,
whatever the heading with which the executive labels his inquiry; the
inevitable intrusion upon the privacy of anyone who happens to fall
within the indiscriminate net of surveillance; the inherent generality of
searches for intelligence; and the unbridled character of a power which
need never justify itself in any forum.
140 Although title III does not grant state officials authority to engage in warrant-
less searches on security grounds, they may proceed against dissident groups by
other means: presentation to a magistrate of affidavits that the members are threaten-
ing to commit an offense dangerous to life, limb, or property and carrying a penalty
of more than one year (e.g., conspiracy to incite riot). Text accompanying notes
43-54 supra. There can be little doubt that many local prosecutors will warm to the
task of seeking intelligence concerning organizations unpopular in their communities.
Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958).
141 Beginning with World War II, bills to remove restrictions imposed by § 605
of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964), and to legalize wiretapping in
specified types of cases were repeatedly introduced in Congress. Theoharis & Meyer,
supra note 114, at 757-68. Until 1968, none of these efforts bore fruit.
142These arguments are elaborated by the Government in its Dellinger brief,
United States v. Dellinger, No. 69 Cr. 180 (N.D. Ill., filed March 20, 1969) (a case
involving claims of justified surveillance based upon the needs of both internal and
external security) ; and its brief in United States v. Brown, No. 30966 (E.D. La.
filed Aug. 22, 1967). Brown was overheard as a result of a wiretap employed to
gather foreign intelligence information.
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In one respect, however, the executive goes further in this area
than in any other. The present administration has stated to the courts,
"There can be no question that the President must and will engage in
intelligence gathering operations which he believes are necessary to
protect the security of the nation"-that is to say, whether or not the
courts approve.'43 The President is, of course, to a very considerable
extent the keeper of his own house and the judge of his constitutional
responsibilities.' 4 It does not follow, however, that, because the Presi-
dent authorizes an electronic surveillance, such as the wiretapping of a
foreign embassy, in order to secure intelligence, the courts must admit
in evidence information gathered by that operation. As the executive
has his responsibilities, the courts have theirs, and they might well
conclude that one incursion upon individual rights does not necessarily
deserve another. 4 '
Consider, by way of comparison, the following hypothetical in-
volving the fifth amendment's protections. A soldier is suspected of
having copied and sold top secret military documents to agents of a
foreign government. He is held incommunicado and questioned for
several days before he admits guilt. He is thereafter questioned for
a further period to determine the dimensions of the security breach. He
cooperates and makes detailed admissions, some of which can be inde-
pendently verified. Although all of this may have been considered vital
from the standpoint of the national security, the soldier may assuredly
prevent the Government from using the fruits of the interrogations for
prosecutorial purposes.'48
It may be said in reply that the fourth amendment speaks only to
unreasonable searches and seizures, whereas the fifth without quali-
fication prohibits compulsion of incriminating testimony. Yet both
amendments are designed for the protection of the individual against the
coercive authority of the state. That purpose would surely be impaired
if the zone of privacy which the individual may reasonably claim for
himself under the fourth amendment should collapse whenever the state
asserts a strong interest in securing information. The authorities, it
should be recalled, had a strong interest in collecting lawful duties from
reluctant American colonists and a reasonable basis for concluding that
143 Brief for the United States at 11, United States v. Dellinger, No. 69 Cr. 180
(N.D. Ill., filed March 20, 1969).
144 The President's power to employ agents to gather intelligence was expressly
recognized in United States v. Totten, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1876).
145As observed in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959), the fourth
amendment serves ultimately as a shield against exploitation of information improperly
obtained "to effect a further deprivation of life or liberty or property."
346The hypothetical case posed in the text is not based on reported cases-
prosecutorial authorities, of course, recognize the bar to the use of testimony obtained
by coercion-but it is far from unreal.
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the most effective means of dealing with the prevalent evasion was by
the conduct of general searches for contraband. What is reasonable
from the standpoint of achieving the sovereign's purposes is not neces-
sarily reasonable from the standpoint of the subject's interest in pre-
serving "some shelter from public scrutiny . . . some inviolate place
which is a man's castle." 147
It is notable that between 1940 and 1968 the federal government
proceeded on the assumption that, whatever the reason for an investi-
gation, it could not properly utilize any information obtained by a
wiretap 148 or trespassory electronic surveillance for prosecutorial pur-
poses. President Roosevelt's circumscribed authorization to the attor-
ney general said as much.149 In a brief filed with the Supreme Court
in 1968, the solicitor general stated that "the government has not
claimed that evidence obtained by electronic eavesdropping in the
course of a national security investigation is admissible in a criminal
trial." 150 The question in that litigation and in companion cases was
whether the Government, having acknowledged that it had overheard
the defendants, was required to make full disclosure of the circum-
stances and contents of the conversations. Contending that an exam-
ination of the interceptions would establish their irrelevancy to the
criminal charges, the Government urged that the initial submission
should be to the trial judge so that he might determine, in camera,
whether there was need for disclosure to the defendants. The Court
rejected that procedure, ruling that when an illegal surveillance has
taken place the defendant is entitled to full disclosure so that he may
explore the question of possible taint in an adversary proceeding. It
left open, however, the question whether it is unlawful for the attorney
general to authorize electronic surveillance in the interest of national
security. This reservation, of course, stimulated the contention, now
litigated in lower federal courts, that such surveillance falls outside the
inhibitions of the fourth amendment." 1
147 United States v. On Lee, 193 F2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dis-
senting), aff'd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
148 Notwithstanding the Oimstead decision, evidence obtained by wiretapping
encountered the statutory prohibition imposed by the Communications Act of 1934,
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964).
149 Text accompanying note 114 supra.
180 Brief for the United States at 8-9, Ivanov v. United States, 394 U.S. 165
(1969). Ivanov was a companion case to Alderman v. United States, discussed in
note 126 supra.
151 The Government filed an unsuccessful petition for rehearing in Ivanov, con-
tending that the requirement of broad disclosure imposed by Alderman would have
serious impact upon government intelligence operations in foreign affairs. As indi-
cated by its petition, it was not yet clear to the Government that the Court had
reserved the question of the lawfulness of the Ivanov surveillance-a point which
became evident after Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969). The Govern-
ment, concerned by what it supposed to be the practical effect of the Ivanov decision,
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The sound answer is that the judiciary should adopt the same ap-
proach whether the attorney general was engaged in seeking evidence
of Mann Act violations, tax evasion, or radical proclivities, or was
simply casting his lines for foreign intelligence information. Indeed,
insofar as the amendment reflects historic opposition to the general
search, the quest for strategic intelligence, whether in the name of secu-
rity or otherwise, is the most difficult to justify. Quite apart from that
consideration, however, the individual's right not to be convicted on
the basis of information obtained through intrusions which violate the
very core of his privacy ought not to be diminished merely because the
suspected offense is serious or the state's interest in seeking information
is substantial.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has not sought to assess the value of electronic sur-
veillance as a technique of investigation and law enforcement. On that
score, there is a wide difference of opinion even among prosecutors,
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pointed out in the petition that during the course of an electronic surveillance seeking
foreign intelligence, a person who is or becomes a defendant in an ordinary criminal
case may be overheard "merely by accident or happenstance, because he simply stumbles
into it." Petition for Rehearing at 8, Ivanov v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, rehearing
denied, 394 U. S. 939 (1969). The comment is, of course, pertinent to the proposition
urged above that electronic searches cannot be confined to predetermined channels.
In the case of such an accidental overhearing, the petition states, it may be readily
apparent that a determination of irrelevancy can be made by the trial judge without
any risk to the defendant. Id. at 7-9. For example, a defendant may have made an
inconsequential phone call to a foreign embassy at a time when the embassy's lines
were being tapped. Plainly, a disclosure of the circumstances of the wiretapping might
cause serious embarrassment. Why not, therefore, permit the trial judge to make an
initial determination whether the overhearing could have conceivably affected the
Government's case against the defendant?
Justice Fortas's opinion in Alderman supported this line of argument. He thought
that the Government's suggested screening procedure should be followed where a
"disclosure of some of the material may pose a serious danger to the national interest."
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 210 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). This author sees no valid objection to this approach if limited, as
the Government proposed, to the case in which it is obvious that the intercepted
material bears no relation to the criminal charges. Such a procedure is comparable to
that followed in cases in which a defendant seeks access to grand jury minutes. See
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966). Moreover, review would be available
by sealing the matter submitted to the trial judge and forwarding it as part of the
appellate record. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
The petition for rehearing in Ivanov was denied, 394 U.S. 939 (1969), but as
noted above it later became clear that the lawfulness of the Ivanov surveillance might
be litigated on remand.
152Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark is prominent among those who have
asserted that the yield is not worth the investment. This is probably a minority view
among law enforcement officials, most of whom have a natural disinclination to
remove any weapon from their arsenal. Various expressions of opinion have been
collected by Professor Herman Schwartz, supra note 42, at 498-508.
Perhaps it should also be noted that electronic surveillance obviously has little
value in the area which is currently causing the greatest public concern-the com-
mission of crimes of violence. It lends itself much more readily to the investigation
of activities which are of a continuing nature, such as gambling and prostitution,
and it has been most widely utilized in those areas. See S. DASH, R. SCH]WARTz &
R. K 0NWLT N, THE EAvESDROPPERS 66, 152 (1959).
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
and all that can be said with assurance is that there is no available body
of data from which reliable conclusions can be drawn. However, it can
be said that the price is intolerable, even if one assumes that the
technique can contribute measurably to strategic intelligence and de-
tection of crime. If older methods of eavesdropping were a "dirty
business," "I3 the possibilities now within grasp are nothing less than
poisonous.
A requirement of antecedent judicial approval is a largely illusory
safeguard. Procurement of a search warrant more often than not is
little more than a formality. In any case, no warrant procedure can
confine an electronic surveillance to the predictable and the relevant.
Such a search is as errant as shifting winds. Nor are there means by
which even the zealous magistrate can effectively control the dissemina-
tion and all of the possible uses of the information surreptitiously
gathered.
Basically, the justification offered by those who would legitimate
electronic intrusion is the asserted need of our society to protect itself
from lawlessness by the most effective means available. But is it really
to be supposed that the weaknesses and deficiencies of a society in which
crime and disorder have become rife will be overcome by authorizing
the nation's police officers to become insidious spies monitoring the
private conversations of the citizenry?
The Supreme Court has laid to rest the concept that the fourth
amendment is violated only when there is a physical trespass, but un-
fortunately has encouraged the notion-upon which the Congress has
now fastened with a vengeance-that both one's premises and one's
privacy of communication may be secretly invaded if only a magistrate
nods or the attorney general sniffs danger to the interests of "security."
These are not imposing limitations. At all events, a decent and civilized
society should provide some area in which the privacy of the individual
is inviolate and he is free to communicate as he pleases without fear
of the state's intrusion. 4
1 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
154 While an unequivocal determination that electronic eavesdropping is incom-
patible with the fourth amendment would not automatically put an end to the practice,
it surely would operate as a very substantial deterrent. This assumes, of course,
that the exclusionary principle would be rigorously applied to evidence obtained in
violation of the amendment. In this connection, it may be observed that courts are not
wholly dependent upon disclosures of official misfeasance volunteered by prosecutors.
In Alderman, the Supreme Court directed the solicitor general to respond to allega-
tions by the defendants that illegal surveillance might have occurred. 394 U.S. at 186.
Orders of that kind are not taken lightly by prosecutorial authorities.
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